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Recent Cases
Tenth Circuit Holds That
Statute Regulating
Alcohol Content
Advertising Does Not
Necessarily Violate The
First Amendment
In Adolph Coors Company v.
Brady , 944 F.2d 1543 (10th Cir.
1991), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held
that alcohol advertising and labeling are commercial speech protected under the First Amendment
and, when restrained, require a
balancing between the interests of
the public and the government.
Facts
In 1987, Adolph Coors Company ("Coors") requested approval
from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms ("Bureau")
for labels and advertisements that
would disclose the alcohol content
of Coors and Coors Light beer. The
Bureau denied Coors's request because the Federal Alcohol Administration Act ("the Act"), 27 U.S.C.
205(e)(2) and (f)(2), prohibits labels or advertisements that disclose the alcohol content of malt
beverages unless otherwise authorized by state law.
District Court's Opinion
Coors sued the Bureau and the
United States Treasury in the
United States District Court for
the District of Colorado. Coors
claimed the Act violated its rights
under the free speech clause of the
First Amendment because the Act
prohibited Coors from disclosing
truthful information regarding the
alcohol content of its products.
Coors requested that the district
court overturn the Bureau's disclosure denial and declare 205(e)(2)
and (f)(2) of the Act unconstitutional.
The Treasury admitted that
these sections were unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
Consequently, the Speaker and Bipartisan Leadership Group of the
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United States House of Representatives ("the House") intervened
in the action to defend the constitutionality of the Act.
The district court concluded
that the sections constituted an
illegal restraint on commercial
speech under the First Amendment. In addition, the district
court found 205(e)(2) and (f)(2) of
the Act unconstitutional and
barred the Bureau from enforcing
the sections. The Treasury and the
House appealed the decision to the
United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit.
Tenth Circuit's Opinion
The Tenth Circuit reversed the
district court's ruling because it
found a factual dispute existed as
to the issues. In its determination
of constitutionality, the appellate
court used a four-part test outlined
by the United States Supreme
Court in Central Hudson Gas v.
Public Serv. Comm'n. , 447 U.S.
557 (1980). This test applies to
regulations that limit commercial
speech and which allegedly violate
the First Amendment. The Central

ANNOUNCEMENT
Consumers Satisfied
with Air Bags
Consumers appear to be relatively satisfied with air bags according to two time-honored tests.
People are not suing over air bags,
and they are not complaining
about them either.
The big three American automobile manufacturers currently have
sold more than 6 million cars with
air bags. They are defendants in
only about 60 lawsuits over air
bags, only one of which concerns a
fatality.
Furthermore, of 200,000 alleged
safety defects reported to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's safety hotline, only
370 complaints concerned air bags.
Finally, since 1987, there have
been recalls of only 10,543 air bags
compared to 4.7 million seat belts.
All of these statistics indicate a
spectacular track record of reliability of air bags.

Hudson test states that a statute is
constitutional if: (1) the expression
being regulated is protected by the
First Amendment; (2) the government interest in the regulation is
substantial; (3) the regulation directly advances this interest; and
(4) the regulation is not overly
restrictive.
First, the appellate court noted
that the Supreme Court has recognized advertising and product labeling as commercial speech. Under the first part of the Central
Hudson test, this speech is protected under the First Amendment if it
involves lawful activity and is not
misleading. The appellate court
stated that, because the proposed
advertising and labeling involved a
legal activity under federal law and
was not misleading, it was protected under the First Amendment.
The second part of the test requires that the government's interest in regulating the disclosure of
alcohol content in advertising and
product labeling is substantial. The
appellate court determined that
the government had a substantial
and legitimate interest in the regulation because it prevented unfair
competition and protected the consumer.
In finding a substantial government interest, the court accepted
the government's argument that a
prohibition on the disclosure of the
alcohol content would prevent
"strength wars" in the brewing
industry. In other words, the statute alleviated pressure on brewers
to produce beer on the basis of an
increased alcohol content. Additionally, the appellate court found
Coors's admission that it wanted
to display the alcohol content of its
product to overcome the product's
image of being a weak beer illustrative of this concern. Thus, the
court maintained that a restriction
on disclosure would result in the
production of lower alcohol content beers, thereby protecting both
the industry and the consumer.
Next, the appellate court determined that the district court had
not addressed the question of
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whether the regulation directly advanced the government's interest.
The lower court did not have the
benefit of a recent Supreme Court
case that provides the framework
for determining whether a regulation directly advances the government's interest. The Tenth Circuit
stated that on remand, the district
court must determine whether the
government demonstrated a connection between its means, regulating alcohol content advertising,
and its interest, preventing
strength wars.
Finally, the appellate court stated that if the district court determined that the government's interest in preventing strength wars was
directly advanced by the regulation, then it must determine
whether the regulation was more
extensive than necessary to serve
this interest. Previously, the district court concluded that the government could have chosen a much
less restrictive alternative, and
therefore, the regulation did not
satisfy the final element of the
CentralHudson test. The appellate
court maintained, however, that
the district court misinterpreted
the analysis of this final element by
using an incorrect standard. The
appellate court stated that the correct question was whether the regulation was proportionate to the
interest being protected; the lower
court should have measured the
public's interest in disclosure
against the government's interest
in preventing strength wars to determine whether the regulation was
overbroad. Therefore, the Tenth
Circuit remanded the case to the
district court for a redetermination
of these last two factors.
Barbara L. Gallagher

Reference To American
Arbitration Association
Rules In Home Warranty
Contract Makes
Arbitration Decision
Binding
In Rainwater v. National Home
Insurance Co., 944 F.2d 190 (4th
Volume 4 Number 2/Winter, 1992

Cir. 1991), the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
held that an arbitration section of a
home warranty contract provided
for final and binding arbitration
since it was written pursuant to
American Arbitration Association
("Association") rules.
Background
When purchasing his home,
Charles Philip Rainwater ("Rainwater") bought a Home Buyers
Warranty Contract with National
Home Insurance Company ("National") as the underwriter. Included in the warranty's coverage were
certain structural defects that must
first occur after the warranty was
purchased. Another section of the
warranty provided for arbitration
of disputes over National's coverage decisions. The warranty stated
that the Association would conduct any arbitration proceedings
according to the Association's
rules. Also, the disputing parties'
participation in arbitration was required before either party could
sue.

Within one year of buying his
house, Rainwater found a crack in
the foundation and filed a claim
under the warranty. National denied coverage, deciding that the
foundation crack first occurred
prior to Rainwater's purchase of
the warranty. In response, Rainwater requested arbitration as provided for in the warranty contract.
After deciding that the foundation crack had first occurred during the warranty period and that it
was a qualified structural defect
under the warranty, the arbitrator
ordered National to repair the
foundation within sixty days. Following Association rules, National
appealed the award. The arbitrator's decision was upheld.
National then sued in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia seeking
a declaratory judgment that it was
not bound by the arbitration decision. The district court dismissed
National's suit, confirmed the arbitration award, and in addition,
awarded Rainwater $206,500 for
reasonable costs of repair. National appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit.

Fourth Circuit's Decision

The Fourth Circuit first recognized the longstanding federal policy of resolving any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable
issues in favor of arbitration. The
court also noted a presumption
that parties who agree to arbitration intend it to be binding. This
policy of favoring arbitration exists, the court stated, because arbitration is an efficient and inexpensive dispute resolution process that
does not take up valuable court
time.
In light of this policy, the Fourth
Circuit addressed whether Rainwater and National had agreed that
the arbitration decision would be
binding or whether it would merely
serve as a condition precedent to
bringing litigation. This issue was
important because the court's jurisdiction to confirm the arbitration award stemmed from the parties' agreement that the award was
final.
Rainwater argued that the
award was final because the arbitration provision of the warranty
contract stated that Association
rules would apply to the arbitration process. Rule 26(c) of the
Association regulations provides
that unless otherwise provided by
law or the applicable document,
the parties involved shall be
deemed to have agreed that any
court having jurisdiction may enter judgment confirming the arbitration award. Rainwater contended that by adopting Association
rules, National agreed that a court
could confirm the arbitration
award and thus impliedly agreed
that the award was final.
The Fourth Circuit agreed, stating that other courts, including the
Seventh and Tenth circuits, had
found that if an arbitration agreement referred to Association rules
and regulations the arbitration was
binding. The Fourth Circuit found
that the lack of explicit agreement
to be bound by arbitration was
inconsequential because reference
to Association rules, which do provide for such a binding effect,
implied such agreement.
National argued that the court
first must determine if the warranty's arbitration provision stipulat(continued on page 64)
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